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Abstract
In the current debate on the relationship between inequality in income distribution and growth
one of the possible link works through the access to education. After reviewing this debate, a
formal model show how the imperfection of financial markets makes educational choices
dependent on the distribution of family incomes. This leads to two testable predictions in the
analysis of aggregate data on school enrolments: a negative (linear) dependence on Gini
concentration index on incomes distribution; and a positive dependence on public resources
invested in education and/or on skill premium in the labour market. This predictions are then
tested on a (unbalanced) panel of 102 countries for the period 1960-90. The main findings of this
analysis are that, once we control for the degree of development with the (log of) per capita
output, financial constraints seem mainly relevant in limiting the access to secondary education.
However, when considering gender differences, there is evidence that female participation to
education is more strongly conditioned by family wealth, starting from primary education. On
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1. Introduction
In recent years there has been a revival of interest in studying the relationship between
inequality and growth. After the works by Kuznets (1955) in the 50s, where the stages of growth
were shaping the degree of inequality in the society, the issue was neglected for almost 30 years,
to reappear again at the beginning of the current decade.
Several studies have proposed alternative explanations of the negative relationship between
inequality and growth of per capita income observed in different samples of countries in the last
30 years. Without any claim of completeness, one could group existing explanations into two
main lines of research that are also represented in Figure 1.1 The first one invokes political
economy actions, in a context of asset markets completeness. Greater inequality raises the
demand for fiscal redistribution, introduces distortions that hamper private investment
decisions.2 An empirical variant of the same idea is that (wealth) inequality makes turmoil more
likely (e.g. the lack of land reform), increases political instability, makes investors' horizons
more shaky and eventually reduces output growth.3  In both cases it is the threat of reduction in
the return of invested capital (or even the risk of expropriation), which is increasing with
inequality, that reduces the agents willingness to invest in physical capital, thus depressing the
potential for growth.
The second line of research considers the borrowing constraints in financing the access to
education as the main explanation for the negative correlation between inequality and growth.4
The poorest part of the population does not possess resources to access education, and they do
not find financial markets where they can borrow these resources to send children to school.5 In
this case fiscal redistribution is efficient because it shifts resources from individuals with low
rates of return to liquidity constrained agents with very high rates of return.6
                                               
1 A good survey of the recent literature is contained in Benabou 1996c.
2 See Alesina and Rodrick 1994, Persson and Tabellini 1994, Perotti 1993, Bertola 1993 and 1994.
3 An additional variant is Mauro 1995, where inequality fosters corruption and depresses investment.
4 See Galor and Zeira 1993, Banerjee and Newman 1993, Torvik 1993, Benabou 1994, 1996a and 1996b.
5 Piketty 1997 claims that it is impossible to create financial markets to finance education, since (future) work
effort is unobservable and contracts contingent on it are not enforceable.
6 Redistributing incomes among agents is not the only way to increase efficiency. A scheme of education subsidies
financed through taxation of future incomes (intertemporal redistribution) recreates the missing market, and allow
the achievement of the first best. See Banerjee and Newman 1993.4






















Empirical tests of these two lines of research are still inconclusive. Almost everyone accepts the
idea of negative correlation,7but it is not yet clear through which variables it operates. The
political economy explanation suffers the lack of evidence of a negative relationship between
redistribution and growth.8 Alesina and Perotti (1996) find evidence of a negative relationship
between inequality and growth via a variable measuring political instability (first principal
component extracted from numbers of riots, assassination, coups); but their analysis has no
predictive power, and the possibility of measuring political instability is questionable.9
It is more difficult to test the second line of research in the absence of information at the
individual level about income and educational choices of the family. Using aggregate data Perotti
(1994) finds that a subjective qualitative measure of credit market rationing is statistically
significant in explaining growth only when interacted with income inequality. However the
most convincing piece of evidence in this respect comes from the comparison between Far
Eastern countries and Latin American ones. The former are characterised by lower inequality
and greater access to school, whereas the latter exhibit the reverse situation; possibly for this
different patterns, the first area experienced sustained growth during the 70s and the 80s, while
the second area underwent stagnation.10
                                               
7 Benabou 1996c states that one standard deviation reduction in inequality increase GNP per capita of about 0.5-
0.7%. Perotti 1996 finds that a GNP 1% increase in middle incomes (proxied by 3° and 4° quartile in income
distribution) yields an increase in GNP per capita growth rate in the order of 0.2%. Persson and Tabellini 1994
provides a higher estimate (in the order of 0.7%).
8 Which actually is positive and significant, as found in Perotti 1996. The same author, when acting as a discussant
of Benabou 1996c, suggest a reverse causation: fast growing economies have more resources available for
redistribution. Alesina 1998 points out that most of the redistributive policies in developing countries benefit
rather the middle class than the poorest.
9 The relationship between inequality and political instability can be read in a reverse way: harsh social conflict
(for example during coups) may cause high number of killings but, if successful, introduces regressive policies that
increase income inequality (e.g. the Chilean case).
10 Bourguignon (1994) finds an overall negative relationship between inequality and growth on a sample of 35
developing countries of small-medium size. His results are mainly driven by the sub-sample of Asian countries,5
The present study provides additional support to this argument by showing that income
inequality reduces school enrolment. The next section presents a formal model of educational
choice, showing that when financial markets are absent (or imperfect) the desired amount of
schooling is proportional to family income.11 Under log-linearization and log-normality in the
distribution of incomes, it is proved that school enrolment and Gini concentration index on
incomes are linearly related. Section 3 describes the dataset and section 4 presents the estimates
of school enrolment rates at different level (primary, secondary and tertiary) in an unbalanced
panel of 102 countries for the period 1960-90. The final section contains concluding remarks.
2. A formal model
Let us introduce an overlapping generations model with constant population of n individuals. In
the first period of her life, each agent allocates her total amount of time (T ) among going to
school (St ), working (Lt ) and leisure (T t ). The amount spent in school increases the human
capital of the agent, and consequently raises the wage in the second period. Thus
T S L T t t t = + + (1)
In the second period she works, consumes (Ct+1) and leaves a bequest (Xt+1) to her off-spring.12
Technology
This economy is populated with n small identical firms, each one producing a homogeneous
commodity.13 Their technology is given by












                                                                                                                                                           
which experienced early land redistribution and more compressed income distribution, combined with
government effort to encourage higher education. He also points out that a positive relationship between inequality
and growth could apply to Latin America countries, via financing of investment (more inequality implies greater
profits and therefore more financing opportunities for investment). Brandolini and Rossi (1998) make an effort to
strengthen data comparability in a sample of 17 countries, and do not find a persistent relationship between
household incomes inequality and growth (even if they speak of social institutions, where the link could be either
positive or negative depending on the country area).
11 It is not clear whether one should speak of income or wealth inequality. Theoretical models tend to escape the
question using two simplifying assumptions: Cobb-Douglas utility functions (savings become a constant fraction of
earned income, and with identical return on invested capital in the long run wealth and income distributions
coincide) and direct proportionality between earnings and human capital (the easiest way is to assume that earnings
are a (log)linear function of invested human capital). Given the absence of fertility choices (in most overlapping
generations models population is assumed to be constant), wealth, income and human capital distributions are
identical in the long run.
12 Commodity consumption in the first period and leisure in the second period have been neglected for simplicity.
13 This assumption can be easily relaxed, since each firm is paying the same wage rate per unit of human capital,
and skilled and unskilled workers are perfect substitutes.6
Total output (Yt ) is net of capital depreciation, the stock of physical capital (K ) is fixed, and the
labour input is given by the sum of human capital endowment (Ht ) of existing workers (Lt ). To
avoid further complications required by saving decisions of different classes,14 I assume that the
ownership of fixed capital is external to this economy (for example, by foreign capitalist holding
the control of the productive sector in a developing economy). This dispense us from analysing
financial savings decision, and focuses on human capital investment.
The firms face an infinitely elastic demand for the commodity at a given price (P). Then profit






















In each period total labour supply is given by the sum of the human capital supply from the
young ( ) H L t
y
t
y ￿  and the human capital supply of the old ( ) H L t
o
t
o ￿ , where
L i j y o i
j, , ,...., , , = ¥ = 0 1  is the labour supply of an individual born in period i and appearing in
the market in the first (y) or in the second (o) period of her life. If each person is born with a
unitary capital endowment (H t t
y = " 1, ), leisure consumption is ruled out in the second period of
life and the length of the working time is normalised to one (L t t
o = " 1, ), labour market





















where, in order to simplify notation, Lt  represents the labour supply of a young person and
Ht-1 is the human capital achievement of the (contemporaneous) old person.15 Notice that Ht-1
is predetermined, because it is based on decisions undertaken in the previous period; on the
contrary, the labour supply decision of the young generation creates a negative externality on






















Human capital can be accumulated through spending some time during the youth in school. The
human capital producing technology is given
                                               
14 See Bertola 1993, 1994 and 1998.
15 In each period there are 2n persons contemporaneously alive, half of which are young. Competition among n
firms allocates 2 workers to each firm; competition among workers allocates one old person and one young person
to each firm. Alternative allocations (for example 2 or more old persons within the same firm) would offer
different wages (because of diminishing marginal productivity), and the worker would be attracted away by firms
offering higher wages.7
H E S t t t =
g q (6)
where Et  indicates total resources devoted to education and is intended to capture all the
different aspects (public expenditure in education, social capital, family background). When old,






















Therefore education is rewarded in the labour market, and the return is increasing in the state of
technology of production (as proxied by K ) and in the amount of resources invested in
education (as proxied by Et ).
Preferences
Individuals are altruistic, and their preferences are defined over leisure when young, and
consumption and bequest when they are old.
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) U T C X T C X t t t t t t , , ( )lg lg lg + + + + = + + + - 1 1 1 1 1 1 r a a (8)
 where Ct+1 indicate the commodity consumption when old and Xt+1 is the bequest left over to
the next generation; ### is the intertemporal discount rate.
Optimal choice of education
Education has a per unity cost of access equal to Bt  (think of enrolment fees, textbooks, etc.),
and therefore the cost of accessing education (S B t t ) is proportional to the preferred amount of
education. When financial markets are absent,16 the budget constraints in the two periods are
independent.
S B W L X t t t t t = + (9)
C X W H t t t t + + + + = 1 1 1 (10)
where Xt  is the inherited wealth from the parents. The optimal choice of education is given by























ł ￿ = ￿





¶ / , , , , (11)
                                               
16 Financial markets for financing investment in education are very thin or in most cases absent. The imperfection
of financial markets in this case can be explained by the impossibility to collaterise future effort on the job. See
Piketty 1997.8
Notice that when financial markets are absent, the optimal amount of education depends
linearly on inherited wealth, whereas the cost of accessing education has a negative impact. The
prevailing wage rate in the labour market has both an income and a substitution effect. The
income effect (through the numerator) is positive because it raises the value of the agent's
endowment. The substitution effect (through the denominator) is negative because attending
school has the opportunity cost of foregone income. For the very same reasons the wage
elasticity has an ambiguous effect.17
The alternative case to be considered is the existence of imperfect financial markets. The
imperfection is modelled as a dependence of the interest rate on individual wealth. If we consider
the possibility of debt default, the incentive to repudiate is proportional to the borrowed
amount. If all the borrowers have the same probability of default (i.e. they belong to the same
class of risk), the lender can ration the credit by setting an interest rate increasing with the
requested loan. In the context of the present model, every agent would like to acquire the same
amount of education, but someone can finance it with family wealth, whereas someone else has
to go on the financial market. The poorer an agent, the higher the required loan, the higher the
interest rate charged by the lender. In a reduced form, the interest rate is inversely related to
family wealth.18
( ) R R X R t = ¢ < , 0 (12)
                                               
17 This is evident if we consider the first order conditions corresponding to the maximisation of utility (8) under
the constraint given by equations (1)-(5)-(7)-(9)-(10). Solving initially for Ct+1 and Xt+1 and replacing these optimal
choices we are left with the following problem
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] max lg lg
, L S t t t t t t t t t t
t t
r T L S W S S B W L L X 1 1 + + + lg S +constant + t - - + - - q m
Equating the two first order conditions leads to
( )
S




























































1 1 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
m = = Lagrange multiplier
dU
dXt













18 An alternative explanation, leading to the same reduced form, is that a lender takes family wealth as collateral,
and charges lower rates to people offering more valuable collaterals. Examples of the interest rate being dependent
of family wealth can be found in Galor and Zeira 1993 or Banerjee and Newman 1993. Empirical evidence on the
relevance of borrowing constraints in human capital investment can be found in Lillard 1998 and Gaviria 1998;
different opinions are reported in Mulligan 1997.9
The intertemporal budget constraint now writes as



















+ + + 1 1 1
1 1
0 (13)
and the optimal choice of education is
( ) [ ] ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
S
W S E
W B R X
f X B W E t
WL t t t
t WL t t



























, , , , (14)
With the existence of financial markets the ambiguity of substitution and income effects
disappears, and one is able to sign each partial derivative. Family wealth still favours the
acquisition of education via a reduction in the relevant interest rate. An increase in the cost of
education lowers its demand, but there can be a countervailing effect coming from total
resources employed in education. Eventually, the current wage in the labour market works as an
opportunity cost, thus reducing the demand for education.
Testable implications
Whether financial markets for education financing exist and/or work closely to the ideal of
market perfection is an empirical issue to be judged case by case. Nevertheless, equation (11) and
(14) provide as with testable predictions on the determinants of educational achievements:
* family income (or wealth) exerts a positive effect, which declines when financial markets
imperfections decline.
* the cost of education creates a barrier to accessing education, which can be lowered with an
increase of public resources invested in education.
* wage differential in favour of educated workers: a lower differential (i.e. a higher Wt  for any given
Wt+1) raises the opportunity cost of schooling and reduces education.
Moving towards empirical testing of these predictions, we can log-linearise equation (14)
obtaining
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
lg lg lg lg lg
lg lg lg lg lg
S s R X W B E W S
R X W B E K L E S
t t t t WL t t t t



























































and using first order approximation
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) lg lg lg lg lg lg S X W B E K t t t t t = + + + + + a a a a a a 0 1 2 3 4 5 (16)
or using small letters to indicate logarithms
s x w b e k t t t t t = + + + + + a a a a a a 0 1 2 3 4 5 (17)10
with expected signs a a a a a 1 2 3 4 5 0 0 0 0 0 ‡ < < > > , , , , .
Given the assumption of identical individuals but inherited wealth, the distribution of st  will
reflect the distribution of xt, all the other variables being shifting parameters for the entire
distribution. Equation (17) can be re-expressed more concisely as
s x w b e k t t = + = + + + + a a a a a a a a 0 1 0 0 2 3 4 5 , (18)
If we accept the rather plausible assumption that family incomes X are log-normally distributed,
then  ( ) x N x x ~ , m s
2  and  ( ) s N x x ~ , a a m a s 0 1
2 2 + . If we had individual information about
education and family background, we could easily test the validity of the previous model by
estimating equation (18) cross-individuals.19 Unfortunately we only have this information
available for few country and for very few years. On the contrary, we have more information
available on their distribution. School enrolment rates can be thought as intervals of the
cumulative distribution function:
P f S dS
P f S dS











= secondary school enrolment














where n n n 1 2 3 ,  and   are respectively the number of years required to complete the primary,
secondary or tertiary level of education, and  ( ) f S  is the density function of S. In addition, the
statistics on income distribution most widely accessible is the Gini concentration index20
( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) G F X Q X g X dX Q X
X
tg t dt X
X




0 0 , (20)
where  ( ) g X  is the density function of X and the term in squared brackets is the vertical distance
between the Lorenz curve and the perfect equality relationship.
Under the joint assumption of the validity of the model described by equation (18) and the
lognormal distribution for X, school enrolment and Gini index are linked by a linear
relationship. In fact, when  ( ) x N x x ~ , m s
2  its density function is given by


























                                               
19 The estimate of  $ a1 would obviously be biased if individuals are heterogeneous with respect to ability, and
ability is correlated with family background. See Card 1994.
20 See for example Cowell 1995, p.141 ss.11

















































In addition, when  ( ) s N x x ~ , a a m a s 0 1
2 2 + , its density function is given by























































Enrolment rates can now be redefined as22
( )






















































































































The intuition underlying this relationship can be grasped by observing figure 2. In the upper
quadrant there are two normal density functions, the solid line corresponding to the case of
m s x x = = 0 1
2 , , and the dashed line to the case of m s x x = = 0 2
2 , . This translates below into the
corresponding cumulative distribution function (north-east quadrant). Assuming a linear
combination of the type s x = + ￿ 0 5 0 8 . .  (south-east quadrant), this maps the cumulative
distribution function of s ~ ( . , . ) ~ ( . , . ) 0 5 0 64 0 5 1 28  or   (south-west quadrant). In the last (north-
west) quadrant I have reported to Lorenz curve corresponding to the distribution of x.23 Now let
us consider an increase in the dispersion of incomes around a given mean (i.e. the passage from
the solid to the dashed line). This implies an increase in the population share with an income
below any given value, and correspondingly an increase in the population share that is unable to
achieve the income threshold which is necessary to access a fixed amount of education. At the
                                               
21 See Zenga 1984.












 one has to consider the opposite of an integral with inverted extremes of
integration.







same time the Gini concentration index for incomes increases. We find corroboration of the
negative association of Gini index for incomes and school participation rates. Figure 3 and 4
consider alternative cases where we have variation in the distribution of s independently of
changes in income dispersion (as measured by the Gini concentration index). Figure 3 shows the
case of an increase in mean income (from 0-solid line to 1-dashed line) for a given variance
(sx
2 1 = ). We obtain here an increase in the access to education for any level of income, given a
constant Gini index. Finally figure 4 keeps income distribution constant and modifies the
relationship between income and education (due to a change in the parameter a0, that reflects
educational expenditure, technology and returns to schooling). The solid line corresponds to the
case of s x = + ￿ 0 5 0 8 . . , whereas the dashed line depicts the case s x = + ￿ 1 0 8 . . Once again, we
obtain an increase in educational achievements for any given level of income.
Summing up, in the context of an overlapping generation model with financial markets
imperfections we have shown that the optimal investment in human capital depends, among
others, on the family income. As long as one is able to control for the mean income and other
variables affecting the educational choice in the aggregate (cost of accessing the school, public
resources devoted to education, wage premium for educated workers in the labour market), we
expect to find a negative relationship between the Gini concentration index on income



































































Figure 2 - The effect of an increase in income dispersion
A
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Figure 4 - The effect of an increase in public spending




































































The data utilized in this analysis come from different sources; data on educational achievements
and school quality are from Barro and Lee (1994, 1996, 1997).24 Data on income inequality are
from Deininger and Squire (1996); data on physical capital stocks are from Nehru and
Dhareshwar (1993); finally, data on female fertility, children mortality and population growth
have been extracted from World Bank (1998). Data refer to 102 countries for the period 1960-90
and report information at quinquennial intervals: therefore at best we have 7 observations for
each country. However with a theoretical dimension of the dataset equal to 714 observations
(102·7), missing information (mainly on income distribution) reduces it by more than one
third, converting it in an unbalanced panel. For the main variables (income inequality indices,
enrolment rates, gross national products and population) we rely on 420 observations (with an
average of 4.1 observations per country), but in most cases when considering additional
information this number has to be reduced even further. Descriptive statistics about these main
variables are reported in Table 1 (entire dataset), whereas information on additional control
variables available are reported in Table A2 in the Appendix. Regional averages are also reported
in the Appendix (tables A1.a-A1.g).
On the whole, these data cover almost half of the 210 countries listed by the World Bank (1998),
but account for 86.3% of the world population (as measured in 1990). Given the fact that this
dataset is forcibly tailored according to the availability of income distribution data, one may
suspect the possible introduction of sample bias. In order to check this possibility, using all the
available information on a greater set of 126 countries, we have run a probit regression
predicting the availability of data on income distribution (see Table A3 in the Appendix). The
results are reassuring: there is only evidence of easier availability of data for bigger countries and
for more recent years. In particular, availability of information on income distribution seems
unrelated with information on school enrolment. Therefore I think that this dataset may
provide a representative picture at the world level of the determinants of schooling
participation.













































































Real gross domestic product per capita - US













Notes: numbers in brackets report the number of non-missing observations in each sample (or sub-sample).
                                               
24 Barro and Lee 1994 is in turn based on Summers and Heston 1991.15
Looking at the descriptive statistics (table 1), we find evidence of well-known stylised facts. In
the aggregate data inequality in income distribution has declined during the 60´s and the 70´s,
then showing an upward surge during the 80´s. However when looking at regional areas, we
cannot find a uniform pattern, thus providing some support to the argument that inequality
does not exhibit a specific trend in post-war period.25 Inequality is highest in Sub-Saharan Africa
and Latin America, and lower in industrialised countries and South Asia. Educational
achievements were quickly rising during the first two decades, but this rise slowed down during
the 80´s. By the beginning of the 90´s, many countries have succeeded in having all the
population enrolled in primary education (OECD countries, Latin America, North Africa and
East Asia). However, while OECD countries have almost reached the complete saturation also
for the second stage of secondary education, all the other countries are still lagging behind, the
worst situation being recorded for Sub-Saharan and South-Asian countries. Analogous picture
emerges when looking at higher education.
Graphical inspection of the association between school enrolment and income inequality
confirms that most of the countries have achieved full participation in education at the primary
level, thus reducing the potential variation in the former variable (Figure 5). On the contrary, at
the secondary and tertiary level of education, a negative correlation emerges clearly (Figures 6
and 7). However, at this stage we ignore whether this evidence is the result of spurious
correlation (when for example inequality and school participation are both function of the stage
of development) or it represent a genuine effect. To ascertain the nature of this effect we have to
move to multivariate regressions.
[figure 5-6-7 about here]
4.The empirical analysis
In the sequel we investigate the determinants of enrolment rates at different stages of education,
and in particular we will concentrate on the effects of income distribution.26 As the model
presented in Section 2 should clarify, the observed enrolment rate is a reduced form
incorporating elements describing household behaviour (demand for schooling) and government
provision of this public service (supply of schooling).27 On the supply side, information about
                                               
25 See, for example, Grilli 1994, Jones 1997 or Li, Squire and Zou 1998.
26 Deininger and Squire 1996 provide data of different quality, according to the coverage of the sample, the
inclusion/exclusion of non labour incomes and information about the recipients (individuals or families). Using
what they define “high quality” data reduces the available observations to 277. However the results are not very
different when extended to include the “low quality” data, even if given their greater variability the estimates are
less efficient. They also stress the different source of information (incomes or expenditures), but controlling with a
dummy on this aspect (either unconstrained or interacted with the Gini variable) does not lead to statistically
significant results. Estimates on a restricted sample including only “high quality” data are available from the
author. Finally, we have also added to the original Deininger and Squire 1996 dataset 5 additional observations on
Gini concentration index (from Honkkila 1998 and World Bank 1998).
27 Information on the private provision of schooling are scattered, and therefore we cannot take into account
information on the supply of private schooling. Arnove and oths. 1997 report an impressive increase of private
institutions providing education, especially at the university level, as a consequence of the decline in public
expenditure in education: in Latin America the share of students enrolled in private universities raised from 5% in
1970 to approximately 30% in 1990.16
state spending and employed teachers is available; on the demand side, beyond information
about income distribution, we will consider demographic factors (birth rates), family
composition (fertility rates) and socio-cultural environment (proxied here by the mortality
rates). Given that schooling is a stage-by-stage process (you cannot enrol at the university unless
you have completed secondary school), the educational achievement at a certain stage is
conditioned by the achievement obtained at the previous stage: given the absence of detailed
information on schooling flows, we will proxy this effect with the average achievement of the
entire population for that level of education. Finally, we will control for the stage of
development by conditioning on the level of real GNP per capita.
Let us recall here that under the existence of financial markets for education financing, one
should not find evidence of any effect of family income on educational choice for children.
Otherwise, if we find a significant and negative effect (more income inequality reduces access to
education), this can be taken as an additional piece of evidence for the existence of borrowing
constraints preventing educational choice for the poorer segments of the population.
Primary education
Full enrolment for primary education has almost been completely achieved by all countries,
especially in most recent years. The public push towards attending compulsory education has
lowered any financial barrier to accessing education, at least at this stage. In fact, we do not find
evidence of any significant effect of income distribution (as measured by Gini indices) on gross
enrolment for primary education. Since the Gini index does not provide a complete ordering of
income distributions (because of crossing of corresponding Lorenz curves) we have also
experimented with the income share accruing to the poorest segment of the population, the
lowest quintile. Even in this case, the variable is statistically non-significant. Columns 1 and 2 of
Table 2 report the fixed effect OLS regressions, whereas random effect estimations are reported
in the Appendix (Table A4). However financial barriers still exist for the female component of
student population: Column 4 of Table 2 re-estimates Column 1 by restricting to female
primary enrolment, and we find here a negative significant impact of income distribution. This
is evidence that expansion of compulsory education has mainly benefited boys, independently of
availability of financial resources from the family. It is interesting to note that the same effect
does not carry over to the random effect estimation (Column 4 in Table A4 in the Appendix):
this implies that there is something which is really country-specific in this effect. In other
words, financial resources still preclude the access to primary education of girls from poor
families in some countries. Why families are more available to afford educational expenditure for
boys than for girls is strongly intertwined with cultural habits.28 Some additional effect of
                                               
28 And social structures, at least for the case of castes in India. In this country primary education is not
compulsory, and child labour is legal. The huge variation in literacy rates (which is 74% among urban males and
20% among rural females) is supposedly explained by the following factors: "The central proposition of this study
is that India's low per capita income and economic situation is less relevant as an explanation than the belief
systems of the state bureaucracy ... At the core of these beliefs are the Indian view of the social order, notions
concerning the respective roles of upper and lower social strata, the role of education as a means of maintaining
differentiations among social classes, and concerns that 'excessive' and 'inappropriate' education for the poor
would disrupt existing social arrangements." (Weiner 1991, 5).17
income distribution can be found looking at mortality rates. If we take child mortality as a
proxy for extreme poverty, we find a significant negative impact on enrolment into primary
education.29
On the supply side, one finds evidence of a negative impact of population growth (as measured
by the crude birth rate), because it necessarily implies a decline of per child resources. And it is
also true that for many countries, limited resources available may prevent school attendance.30
This could constitute the explanation of the rather counterintuitive result of the number of
students per teacher exhibiting a significant and positive impact (instead of a negative one, as one
would have expected thinking of greater resources and better quality being associated with lower
values of this variable). In other words, a greater number of students per teacher would indicate
a country’s efforts to catch up with full attendance of primary education.31 We were unable to
find strong effects of educational expenditure on enrolment: using the (log of) governmental
current expenditure on primary education per pupil, the ratio of its level with per capita income
and the (log of) average salary for a primary school teacher exerted a negative but statistically
insignificant effect.32 Using the ratio of the latter variable with per capita income exerts a
significant negative effect (column 5 in Table 2), which requires some discussion. Following
Hanushek (1995) we would expect an insignificant effect of financial resources on enrolment
rates, because of inefficient allocation of resources. On the contrary, in accordance to the
previous model, we expect that an increase in public resources coeteris paribus should facilitate
school attendance, and therefore increase school enrolment. However we do not measure here
the total financial effort of the state in supporting primary education, but only the relative wage
of teachers. Thus, for given resources, better paid teachers necessarily implies less teachers, less
or more crowded classes, and consequently less availability of the educational service.33 This is
for example the explanation advanced for the decline in primary enrolment for sub-Saharan
Africa in the last decade by Ridker (1994).34 Should we take this evidence as supporting the idea
of cutting teachers’ wages as a measure to increase school participation? Not necessarily; and for
at least two reasons. The first one is the limited size of this effect: with the estimated coefficient,
in order to increase primary enrolment of 1% it would be necessary (at given GDP per capita) to
almost half the existing wage level. Second, at least in the case of Africa, it is argued that given
the already low level of pay a reduction in teachers' wages would induce a reduction in effort, in
                                               
29 Unfortunately children mortality proxies too many effects that interplay with primary education. For example,
children mortality is negatively correlated with mother education and with health conditions (sanitation, doctors
availability, etc.). For this reason we do not want to put excessive emphasis on an "income distribution"
interpretation.
30 In the case of Tanzania, for example, where primary attendance was 0.34 in 1970, 0.70 in 1980 and 0.93 in 1990,
class dimension can vary between 30 to 74 in rural areas. See Tibaijuka and Cormack 1998.
31 That the number of students per teacher does not represent a good proxy for school quality has already pointed
out (see for example Hanushek 1986, 1995 and 1996).
32 The estimated coefficients for these variables, including all the variables reported in Column 1 of Table 2, are
respectively -0.013 (0.96), -0.001 (0.89) and -0.015 (1.33), with associated number of observations 343, 337 and 315.
33 Which could possibly be of higher quality if the teachers wage reflects their unobservable ability in teaching.
34 He notices that the lack of locally trained manpower attracts expatriates, which have higher reservation wages
and are often remunerated with grant aids, then crowding out local competencies even further. A negative effect of
teacher wages onto primary and secondary enrolment is also found by Schultz 1988.18
order to supplement their income with additional jobs.35 We will return on the issue in the
concluding section.
On the demand side, family background seems to account for some variation. If we take the
fertility rate36 as proportional to the average number of children in a family, we could expect
either negative or positive effects. The former case applies when resources are binding—the
greater the number of the children in a family, the lower are the resources per capita, the greater
is the opportunity cost of school attendance. On the contrary, the latter case applies when
supportive effects could be accounted for; in this case, the greater the number of siblings, the
higher is the probability that someone else has already had some schooling experience, and
therefore the higher is the chance of getting some help at home.37 The relevance of the cultural
environment (the so-called social capital) is also witnessed by the positive effect played by the
stock of people with some (but not completed) primary education. The positive effect could be
explained on two grounds: on one side, some of the population (older than 15 years) with
uncompleted primary education could re-enrol into primary education, thus raising the gross
rate of enrolment; on the other side, it may be correlated with the effort of a country to
overcome illiteracy, and therefore it describes the pressure put on children to enrol and
complete primary education.38
                                               
35 This argument is made by Tibaijuka and Cormack 1998. However in my data-set teacher wages in Africa are not
extremely low, at least in relative terms: in 1990 the average salary for primary school teacher (measured in 1985
US dollar, converted with PPP) was 5442 (17 countries; ratio to per-capita gdp=3.5) for Sub-Saharan Africa, 10324
(8 countries; gdp ratio=2.5) for North Africa and the Middle East, and 7770 (11 countries; gdp ratio=2) for Latin
America and the Caribbean.
36 The fertility rate indicates the number of potential children that an "average" woman - i.e. following the average
behaviour of the country in terms of marriage age, frequency of pregnancies, etc. - could give birth to during her
fertility period.
37 Similar results were obtained by Schultz 1988 on a sample of 155 countries over the period 1950-80, when he
found a positive effect of the relative size of school aged population onto enrolment rates for primary education.
38 Introducing the illiteracy rate as explanatory variable comes out statistically significant with a negative sign, but
the number of observation drops to 195 (corresponding to 69 countries). Analogously, if using the number of daily
newspapers for 1000 inhabitants, one obtains a mildly significant (t-ratio 1.18) and negative coefficient, but the
number of observation reduces even further (173 observations, for 82 countries, all of them referred to the 1980-90
period).19
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# of observations/# of countries 400/88 268/78 400/88 391/88 304/78
Corr. btw random component and indv explanatory vrbl 0.04 0.11 -0.06 0.11 0.25
R2 overall 0.58 0.53 0.58 0.66 0.64












The process of schooling (even primary one) is obviously related to the stage of development of
a country. If we measure this stage with the (real) gross domestic product per capita, we find
effectively that primary enrolment is positively associated with its logarithm. But exploiting a
suggestion originally advanced by Sen (1976), and subsequently followed by international
agencies as a starting point to measure the degree of human development,39 we correct the level
of per capita product Y with the contemporaneous Gini concentration index G, thus obtaining a
measure of ‘inequality-adjusted real income’ Yadjust
( ) Y Y G adjust = ￿ - 1 (25)
Notice that when using the logarithm of Yadjust, a one-percent increase in Y is (approximately)
equivalent to a one point reduction in the Gini index. The variable Yadjust comes out highly
significant, with a rather low semi-elasticity of 0.05 (column 3 of Table 2); it implies that in
order to obtain an increase in primary enrolment of 1% one would require an increase in per
                                               
39 See the various issues of the Human Development Report (UNDP 1997).20
capita income of 20%, maintaining constant the inequality in income distribution. All the other
variables keep previous signs and significance, but there is an increase in the explanatory power
of this specification.40
Secondary education
When passing to secondary education, we find significant evidence of financial barriers to
accessing this level of education. The Gini index comes out significantly negative: a 1 per cent
decline in the index (more equalitarian distribution) implies a 0.25% rise in secondary enrolment
(columns 1 and 2 of Table 3). The same effect is obtained when considering ‘inequality-adjusted
Yadjust, with a somehow lower impact (column 3 of Table 3). Analogous measures
obtain for the random effect model (Table A5 in the Appendix).41 Also in this case we find
evidence of persistent discrimination against girls: a significant increase in inequality (say a
DGini = +0 05 . ) reduces secondary school enrolment to 1% for boys and 1.8% for girls. Notice in
addition that the coefficient measuring the impact of inequality for girls is bigger than in the
case of primary school (-0.36 against -0.16), thus financial constraints are more relevant at this
stage of education. Finally, the income share of the lowest quintile presents a negative sign, but
is not significantly different from 0.
On the supply side we could not find any significant effect of resources invested in education;
the (log of) governmental current expenditure on secondary education per pupil, the ratio of its
level with per capita income, or even the number of pupils per teacher, all variables exert a
statistically insignificant effect.42 The only aspect related to the public supply of secondary
education has to do with the ‘vertical integration’ of this process; if we consider that a student
can enrol in secondary school only if s/he has completed the primary level, it is evident that an
increase in the completion of primary education provides additional inputs to the next stage of
production. Effectively, we find that the average years of completed primary education in the
population43 plays a significant positive effect; raising sample mean (3.94 years) by an additional
                                               
40 In addition to an increase in F test and R2 within statistics, this is confirmed by the Hausman specification test
in the random effect version: see Column 3 of Table A4 in the Appendix. Substantially, Column 3 corresponds
(approximately) to imposing a restriction on the coefficients of logY and G in Column 1, which cannot be rejected
by the data. Imposing the restriction coefficient Y coefficient G (log ) ( ) = -  in Column 1 of Table 2 has an  F-
test(1,305)=0.05 (p-value 0.82).
41 In the estimation of the random effect model, the Hausman test indicates potential mispecification, which
disappears when decomposing the GDP per capita effect into a country mean effect and a deviation from country
mean effect. Given that the latter effect is significantly bigger than the former, this suggest that for secondary
enrolment the growth rate is much more discriminating than the stage of development (as measured by country
mean effect).
42 The estimated coefficients for these variables, including all the variables reported in Column 1 in Table 3, are
respectively -0.0167 (1.14), -0.0001 (0.68) and 0.0006 (0.45), with associated number of observations 295, 293 and
339. There are no information available on average salary of secondary school teachers.
43 The variable "average years of primary education" (sample mean referred to the population over 15 is 3.96 years)
is obtained by multiplying the variable "share of the population with completed and uncompleted primary
education" (sample mean referred to the population over 15 is 0.632) with the variable "years of duration of
primary education" (sample mean referred to 1965 is 6.31). Therefore an increase of one year in the average years of21
year should induce an increase in secondary enrolment in the order of 3-8 percentage points,
depending on the chosen specification.
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# of observations/# of countries 360/73 239/65 360/73 346/73
Corr. btw random component and indv explanatory vrbl 0.03 0.30 0.06 0.11
R2 overall 0.77 0.74 0.74 0.81










On the demand side we find evidence of some effect given by the family composition, as proxied
by the fertility rate. While this variable exhibits a positive effect at primary level (and was
explained there as evidence of the effort of supportive effect within the family), in this case it
presents a clearly negative impact, which can be interpreted as evidence of a family resource
effect. If we consider that sending a child to a secondary school (which in most countries exceeds
the threshold of compulsory education) is a more requiring task (at least on the financial side),
an increase in family size implies a reduction in resources per child (in terms of both income,
partially captures by the inequality and output per capita variables, and time devoted to children
support by the parents).
Family choices seem also to respond to the existing situation on the labour market, probably via
differential returns for education and/or differential employment probability.44 Under the
assumption of complementarity between human and physical capital in production,45 we can
                                                                                                                                                           
primary education can be obtained by increasing the primary attendance in the population by 0.158 (obtained as
result of 1/6.31).
44 These two channels cannot be directly tested because of the lack of appropriate data. Estimates of returns to
schooling for several countries (but limited to very few years) are reported in Psacharopulos 1994. Unemployment
rates for educational attainments do not exist on such a long time span and for so many countries.
45 A rather plausible assumption: see Benabou 1996b and 1996c.22
approximate the skill requirement in the economy with existing capital intensity (ratio of
physical capital to output). In such a case, we observe that an increase in demands for skills in
the labour market (i.e. an increase in capital/output ratio) induces an increase in secondary
school enrolment. However the size of the effect is not very high; a 10% increase in
capital/output ratio (from an average of 2.58 to 2.84) would raise secondary enrolment just
0.4%.46
Higher education
Moving finally to higher education, as in the case of primary education, we do not find evidence
of direct impact of either income inequality or first quintile shares on higher education
enrolment (columns 1 and 2 in Table 4).47 Given the fact that many authors stress that public
finance of tertiary education has a regressive effect because the offspring of the middle-classes are
over represented, we have also tested the possible existence of liquidity constraints within this
group by using the income share of each quintile (taken either separately or jointly), but we
could not detect any statistically significant effect. When we make use of the ‘inequality-adjusted
Yadjust, the variable is significant but the result is mainly driven by the underlying
effect of output per capita.48 More surprising is the result that borrowing constraints seem to
affect male enrolment more than female enrolment. The differences in sample averages between
the enrolment rates of the two genders are not very pronounced (16.2% for men against 11.4%
for women), and therefore we cannot explain it with a composition effect. We believe that the
explanation lies in the fact that the daughters from financially constrained families have already
abandoned school at earlier stages, and therefore the 11% actually enrolled in school belong to
rich families. On the contrary, since financial constraints restrain male enrolment only starting
from secondary level, the selection according to family resources has operated less hardly among
them, and we can still find sons from middle-class families that are financially constrained when
asked to afford the enrolment at university.
                                               
46 This evidence is confirmed by including another variable, the "ratio of total worker to population" which Barro
and Lee 1994 report as drawn from Summer and Heston 1991, and extends up to 1985. We have been unable to
update this variable in a consistent way. However if we re-estimate the model reported in Column 1 of Table 3
over the period 1960-85 including this variable, it comes out significant with coefficient equal to 0.491 (1.96). This
implies that an increase in the employment rate of 10% calls for an increase in secondary enrolment of almost 5%.
This seems unrelated to the type of secondary education that is available: a variable measuring the share of
vocational education in secondary one is statistically insignificant.
47 We have dropped two observation for the 1990 taken from World Bank 1998, because they seem rather
unreliable, especially when compared to the corresponding value in 1985: they are Canada (0.947) and United
States (0.752).
48 Here again, the data (using the specification of Column 1 in Table 4) do not reject the restriction
coefficient Y coefficient G (log ) ( ) = - : F-test(1,224)=0.02 (p-value 0.89).23
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# of observations/# of countries 300/71 207/64 300/71 254/70 253/69
Corr. btw random component and indv explanatory vrbl 0.08 0.15 0.07 -0.24 0.23
R2 overall 0.61 0.51 0.60 0.59 0.56












As far as the supply of higher education is concerned, we do not have direct information about
the resources invested at this stage of education. Nevertheless, there is evidence of a positive
effect of public expenditure per pupil at the previous stage. If we take this variable as a proxy of
the quality of education provided at secondary school, this evidence suggests that increasing the
resources invested at one stage of education can be ineffective in raising student participation at
that level (and effectively there is no evidence of significant impact of this variable onto
secondary enrolment), but can be beneficial in favouring the transition to the next stage (for
example by raising the self-confidence of the students).49 This impact is rather low; a 10%
increase in public expenditure per student enrolled in secondary school (equal to 103 US dollars
measured at 1985 prices) induces an increase of 0.16 percentage points in higher education
enrolment. The interdependence between sequential stages of education emerges also by the
positive effect exerted by the average years of secondary education achieved in the population
aged over 15 years; an addition year (from a sample average of 1.4 years) induces an increase of
almost 50% in higher education enrolment.
On the demand side, the only evidence comes from the demand for skilled workers, as proxied
by the capital/output ratio. Even if the coefficient is lower than in the case of secondary
                                               
49 Empirical evidence on the role of self-confidence is limited. In a NLS sample Lillard (1998) finds a significant
effect of "... family dummy variables measuring whether or not the son expects 'much' help from his parents to
pursue higher education and how much his parents encouraged him to pursue higher education" (p.17). These
dummies are significant in predicting both school performance and earnings.24
education, the elasticities are of comparable magnitude (see the following Table 5). This is
possibly indicative that the productive sector requires more technical training (mostly provided
by secondary schools) than professional credentials provided by universities. Notice moreover
the effect of this variable is significantly higher for men than for women.
5. Conclusions
In this study we have examined some empirical evidence in support of the negative correlation
between inequality and growth. After a short review of existing literature, we have proposed an
overlapping generation model, where the individuals have the opportunity to invest part of their
time in education, in exchange for higher income in the following period. Since education is
costly, when financial markets are absent (or work imperfectly, charging interest rates that are
inversely proportional to family wealth) the optimal choice of education is wealth constrained.
This leads to two testable predictions in the analysis of aggregate data on school enrolments; a
negative (linear) dependence on Gini concentration index on income distribution; and a positive
dependence on public resources invested in education and/or on skill premiums in the labour
market. These predictions are then tested on a (unbalanced) panel of 102 countries for the period
1960-90.
The main findings of this analysis are summarised in Table 5. Once we control for the degree of
development with the (log of) per capita output, financial constraints seem mainly relevant in
limiting the access to secondary education. However, when we consider gender differences, there
is evidence that female participation to education is more strongly conditioned by family
wealth, starting from primary education. On the contrary there is no clear evidence of a relevant
impact of invested resources, but at the tertiary level. Some positive effect is also played by
labour demand for skilled workers, which tend to raise enrolment in post-primary education.
Other conditioning variables, at primary and secondary level, are fertility rates and mortality
rates, which tend to capture other aspects of social development. Finally, the data show that
increasing education at one stage raises the odds for following stages.
Table 5 – Comparative elasticities of enrolment at different educational level
Primary Secondary Higher
Gini index of income distribution
(1st column in tables 2-3-4)
-0.021 -0.220** -0.206
(Log of) inequality adjusted real GNP per capita
(3rd column in tables 2-3-4)
0.058** 0.292** 0.477**
Average years of completed education at
previous stage (1st column in tables 2-3-4)
0.065** 0.661** 0.701**
Ratio of physical capital stock to GDP
(1st column in tables 2-3-4)
 --- 0.093** 0.094*
only female
Gini index of income distribution
(4th column in tables 2-3-4)
-0.076** -0.313** -0.258*
Average years of completed education at
previous stage (4th column in tables 2-3-4)
0.028** 0.483** 0.535**
* statistically significant at 95% ** statistically significant at 99%25
Income redistribution seems to matter for educational goals. The size of the effect is not
impressive: lowering the Gini index by 5 percentage points, a sizeable change, produces a total
increase in school participation of almost 2 percentage points.50 However, if one is willing to
believe in the conclusions of the present study, if a country wants to raise the educational level
of its population, more than spending additional resources on building schools and hiring
teachers, it should rather prefer to implement redistributive policies (via taxes and/or subsidies).
As long as these policies are effective in reducing income inequalities within the population,
they are also capable to relax financial constraints faced by poorest families, and promote school
enrolment.
In the light of statistical irrelevance of invested resources in promoting enrolment, any policy
recommendation on expenditure reallocation (for example, from tertiary to primary, or vice
versa) seems pointless, given the limited impact of resources on school enrolment.51 But a similar
argument applies to the idea of expanding a private provider of education. As long as school fees
create an additional financial barrier to continuing education, we expect a reduction in total
enrolment because it raises financial barriers against constrained families.52
                                               
50 This incorporate the direct effect (first line of table 5) and the indirect effect (first line times third line lagged of
one level).
51 These policy advices are based on the comparison between private an social returns to education. Since the
typical ranking of returns is primary > secondary > tertiary, there should be ground to claim an expenditure
reallocation in favour of primary level. See Birdsall and James 1993.
52 For this reason it is hard to accept the following statement: "...preliminary evidence suggests that the second
pattern - restricted public sector capacity and a large private sector - is superior with respect to access, providing
much higher overall enrolment ratios and thus higher rates of participation by lower-income groups." (Birdsall and
James 1993, p.344).26
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Gross enrolment rate in primary education 0.604
(191)
0.285 0.437 0.536 0.720 0.709
Gross enrolment rate in secondary education 0.119
(184)
0.115 0.039 0.079 0.151 0.222
Gross enrolment rate in higher education 0.011
(186)
0.015 0.002 0.007 0.014 0.025
Gini index of income distribution 0.493
(81)
0.099 0.517 0.540 0.485 0.456
Total population (thnds) 9554
(203)
14198 6116 8013 10701 13850
Real gross domestic product per capita - US
dollars (1985 international prices)
1086.1
(196)
971.8 817 1013 1211 1304
Notes: numbers in brackets report the number of non-missing observations in each sample (or sub-sample). It includes 29
countries: Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea,
Guinea-Bissau, Cote d'Ivoire, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritania, Mauritius, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda,
Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe.














Gross enrolment rate in primary education 0.787
(62)
0.238 0.611 0.722 0.872 0.921
Gross enrolment rate in secondary education 0.382
(61)
0.257 0.192 0.276 0.474 0.637
Gross enrolment rate in higher education 0.075
(61)
0.086 0.021 0.045 0.111 0.136
Gini index of income distribution 0.414
(33)
0.073 0.472 0.436 0.404 0.376
Total population (thnds) 14032
(63)
14343 9032 11817 15311 20419
Real gross domestic product per capita - US
dollars (1985 international prices)
2771.3
(61)
1975.2 1675 2370 3138 3662
Notes: numbers in brackets report the number of non-missing observations in each sample (or sub-sample). It includes 9
countries: Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Iran, Israel, Jordan, North Yemen, Cyprus.














Gross enrolment rate in primary education 0.958
(69)
0.072 0.907 0.947 0.994 0.991
Gross enrolment rate in secondary education 0.514
(69)
0.257 0.283 0.455 0.631 0.663
Gross enrolment rate in higher education 0.116
(69)
0.100 0.046 0.084 0.134 0.205
Gini index of income distribution 0.403
(63)
0.071 0.439 0.397 0.389 0.397
Total population (thnds) 40700
(68)
46579 29328 36188 44058 54482
Real gross domestic product per capita - US
dollars (1985 international prices)
3833.5
(70)
3333.5 1518 2738 4662 7136
Notes: numbers in brackets report the number of non-missing observations in each sample (or sub-sample). It includes 10
countries: Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, Fiji.30














Gross enrolment rate in primary education 0.662
(35)
0.254 0.486 0.584 0.734 0.874
Gross enrolment rate in secondary education 0.256
(35)
0.161 0.144 0.230 0.270 0.390
Gross enrolment rate in higher education 0.034
(35)
0.024 0.010 0.031 0.040 0.046
Gini index of income distribution 0.355
(29)
0.059 0.377 0.335 0.362 0.298
Total population (thnds) 162765
(35)
247449 112602 142258 178410 221599
Real gross domestic product per capita - US
dollars (1985 international prices)
1034.8
(34)
404.9 792 914 1123 1467
Notes: numbers in brackets report the number of non-missing observations in each sample (or sub-sample). It includes 5
countries: Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka.














Gross enrolment rate in primary education 0.936
(158)
0.111 0.872 0.932 0.965 0.970
Gross enrolment rate in secondary education 0.382
(158)
0.195 0.195 0.323 0.475 0.521
Gross enrolment rate in higher education 0.105
(156)
0.085 0.029 0.064 0.138 0.186
Gini index of income distribution 0.488
(106)
0.078 0.489 0.504 0.493 0.493
Total population (thnds) 13337
(161)
25227 8848 11658 14889 18114
Real gross domestic product per capita - US
dollars (1985 international prices)
3082.4
(160)
1835.7 2261 2959 3787 3410
Notes: numbers in brackets report the number of non-missing observations in each sample (or sub-sample). It includes 23
countries: Barbados, Costa Rica, Dominica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama,
Trinidad and Tobago, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Surinam, Uruguay,
Venezuela.














Gross enrolment rate in primary education 0.985
(154)
0.036 0.981 0.974 0.988 0.990
Gross enrolment rate in secondary education 0.723
(152)
0.219 0.485 0.690 0.807 0.904
Gross enrolment rate in higher education 0.217
(153)
0.144 0.089 0.164 0.249 0.387
Gini index of income distribution 0.352
(123)
0.075 0.432 0.359 0.331 0.323
Total population (thnds) 29039
(154)
45904 24833 27756 30142 33147
Real gross domestic product per capita – US
dollars (1985 international prices)
9314.9
(154)
3720.3 5842 8355 10511 12793
Notes: numbers in brackets report the number of non-missing observations in each sample (or sub-sample). It includes 22
countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, (West) Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom,
United States.31














Gross enrolment rate in primary education 0.973
(27)
0.058 1.000 0.965 0.987 0.912
Gross enrolment rate in secondary education 0.600
(26)
0.177 0.365 0.530 0.692 0.680
Gross enrolment rate in higher education 0.140
(20)
0.056 0.078 0.133 0.174 0.142
Gini index of income distribution 0.273
(25)
0.041 0.259 0.249 0.281 0.290
Total population (thnds) 363655
(18)
455315 337.947 425523 509219 298543
Real gross domestic product per capita - US
dollars (1985 international prices)
3571.1
(22)
1535.3 1953 2629 4099 4028
Notes: numbers in brackets report the number of non-missing observations in each sample (or sub-sample). It includes 4
countries: China, Hungary, Poland, Yugoslavia.
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Gross enrolment rate in primary education 420 0.897 0.180 0.050 1.000
Gross enrolment rate in secondary education 420 0.484 0.290 0.005 1.010
Gross enrolment rate in higher education 420 0.131 0.128 0.000 0.947
Gini index of income distribution 420 0.420 0.101 0.233 0.795
Income share of the lowest quintile in income distribution 271 0.059 0.020 0.016 0.108
Fertility rate (potential children per woman) 410 4.26 1.93 1.44 8.256
Crude birth rate (per 1000 inhabitants) 414 29.33 12.79 10 57.2
Children mortality rate in the 1st year (per 1000 births) 416 0.060 .0501 0.001 0.218
Government current expenditure in secondary education per
pupil – US dollars (PPP-adjusted 1985 intern.prices)
337 1029.5 951.8 32 4572
Student per teacher in primary education 419 31.22 11.90 6.1 90.4
Real gross domestic product per capita – US dollars (PPP-
adjusted 1985 international prices)
420 4768.5 4123.1 308 18399
Ratio of physical capital stock to GDP (1987 local prices) 382 2.58 0.97 0.67 7.43
Share of the population over 15
with some primary education
394 0.445 0180 0.022 0.901
Average years of completed primary education
in the population over 15
394 3.94 1.78 0.24 8.11
Average years of completed secondary education
in the population over 15
394 1.34 1.00 0.03 5.1532
Table A3 – Probit regression for availability of income distribution data
 – Random-effects GEE regression – 1960-90
Dependent variable:






Real gross domestic product per capita 0.000004 0.000 0.693
(Log of) population  0.1999 0.074 0.008
Growth rate of population -0.2546 1.646 0.877
Gross enrolment rate in primary education -0.0169 0.098 0.864
Gross enrolment rate in secondary education  0.0162 0.127 0.899
Gross enrolment rate in higher education  0.0645 0.293 0.826
Dummy for Asian countries -0.6084 0.672 0.365
Dummy for African countries -0.3077 0.635 0.628
Dummy for Latin-American countries  0.8643 0.754 0.252
Dummy for Australian countries  -0.4572 0.861 0.596
Dummy for OECD countries  0.7986 0.750 0.287
Dummy for year=1965 -0.0236 0.034 0.491
Dummy for year=1970 -0.0478 0.040 0.232
Dummy for year=1975 -0.0719 0.049 0.142
Dummy for year=1980 -0.0981 0.060 0.103
Dummy for year=1985 -0.1235 0.068 0.071
Dummy for year=1990 -0.1464 0.077 0.058
Constant -0.6448 0.771 0.403
# of observations/# of countries 761/126
###2 test 16.22 (0.51)33












Gross enrolment rate in primary education
total total total female total





















(Log of) inequality adjusted real GNP per capita --- --- 0.0374
(2.64)
--- ---
































Share of the corresponding population over 15





















Average salary primary school teacher/GDP per capita --- --- --- --- -0.0001
(4.16)
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# of observations/# of countries 400/88 268/78 400/88 391/88 304/78
R2 overall 0.65 0.62 0.64 0.73 0.70































Gross enrolment rate in secondary education
total total total female



















(Log of) Real gross domestic product per capita












(Log of) inequality adjusted real GNP per capita












Average years of completed primary education



















Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
# of observations/# of countries 360/73 239/65 360/73 346/73
R2 overall 0.82 0.80 0.82 0.84





























Gross enrolment rate in higher education
total total total female male























(Log of) Real gross domestic product per capita














(Log of) inequality adjusted real GNP per capita




(Log of) government current expenditure in secondary











Average years of completed secondary education























Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# of observations/# of countries 300/71 207/64 300/71 254/70 253/69
R2 overall 0.67 0.65 0.67 0.64 0.69





















Figure 5 - Primary education
gini index of inequality




Figure 6 - Secondary education
gini index of inequality




Figure 7 - Higher education
gini index of inequality
 gross enroll rt higher educatio  predicted higher participation
.1783 .795
-.035292
.577